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INTRODUCTION
Police often find themselves navigating difficult moral situ-
ations.2  They may find it necessary to tell lies despite moral
reservations because lies can be a useful tool in controlling
situations and avoiding the use of force.3  Police may also jus-
tify lies when they lead to a desirable outcome.  When police
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
† PhD/JD candidate, Developmental Psychology and Law, Cornell Univer-
sity; Editor-in-Chief, Cornell Law Review, Volume 102.  I would like to thank
Stephen Garvey for his guidance and thoughtful comments during the writing of
this Note and the members of the Cornell Law Review; especially Victor Pinedo,
Sue Pado, Evan Hall, Anthony Wu, Caisa Royer, and Lex Varga; for their detailed
editing.  I am also grateful for the mentorship of Valerie Hans, John Blume, and
Stephen Ceci.  Their work inspired me to write this Note.  And as always, thank
you to my family; especially Suzan Courtney, George Hritz, Mary Beth Hritz, Alex
Bodell, Chuck, and Pierre; for their support throughout my time at Cornell.
2 See Carl B. Klockars, Blue Lies and Police Placebos: The Moralities of Police
Lying, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 529, 532–33 (1984).
3 See id. at 543; Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Decep-
tive Interrogation, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1992, at 3, 7–9.
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use lies to obtain evidence, police may justify the harm caused
by lies as outweighed by the good from catching wrongdoers.
During interrogations, however, we must closely scrutinize
police practices.  In the interrogation room, police officers have
a superior bargaining position because they control the envi-
ronment and place the suspect in a heightened state of vulner-
ability.4  In addition, police have a powerful tool of persuasion:
they can threaten the suspect with punishment.  Through lies,
police are able to manipulate suspects by altering their percep-
tion of their options.  This manipulation shows disrespect for
the suspect’s individuality, undermines the trust in police, and
violates the presumption of innocence.
Even in the hypothetical case in which a guilty suspect is
Mirandized; knowingly, willfully, and voluntarily waives his Mi-
randa rights; is lied to by police; and confesses truthfully, I
argue his confession should be excluded because the police lie
renders the confession involuntary.  In the context of interroga-
tions, police lies are prima facie wrongful and should be com-
pletely banned unless necessary to avoid an imminent harm.5
Police suspected Adrian Thomas, a twenty-nine-year-old
man with a tenth-grade education, of critically injuring his in-
fant son based on the emergency room doctor’s opinion that
the child’s skull was fractured.6  Police interrogated Thomas for
hours, admittedly doing whatever they could to convince him to
tell them what they believed to be “the truth.”  Toward that end,
the police told Thomas multiple lies.  They told him he could
save his child’s life if only he explained how his child’s head
became injured, even though the child was brain-dead and had
no hope of recovery.  After many hours of denying that he had
ever harmed his son, and police telling him that he could save
his son’s life twenty-one times, Thomas agreed that he may
have dropped his son.  After further questioning, Thomas
agreed that he threw his son on the ground.  Eventually
Thomas reenacted the crime for the police by throwing a binder
on the ground.  The police also repeatedly told Thomas that if
he confessed he would not be arrested and could go home.  The
police even solemnly promised Thomas that they were not lying
to him.  The trial court admitted Thomas’s confession and the
4 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449–59.
5 Even in a situation where the lie would promote public safety and the
imposition of just deserts, it is still an unjustified wrong and should not be
employed by state actors.  For a discussion of the utilitarian standard regarding
deception, see Skolnick & Leo, supra note 3, at 88. R
6 SCENES OF A CRIME (New Box Prod. 2011).
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jury convicted, despite all of these lies and medical evidence
that the son’s skull was not broken and that he may have died
of an infection, not a head injury.
The psychological techniques used by the police during the
interrogation of Thomas are not unique; police have been em-
ploying them to extract confessions for decades.7  While police
deception rarely renders a confession inadmissible, the New
York Court of Appeals held that Thomas’s confession should
have been suppressed.8  The court noted that not all of the lies
that the police told Thomas were coercive, but some of them
were, including the statement that Thomas could save his son’s
life by confessing.9  The court held these extreme forms of de-
ception were overly coercive, so the statements that Thomas
made in response were involuntary.10  This holding should be
expanded to recognize that all forms of police lies to suspects
during interrogations are coercive, and all confessions result-
ing from these lies should therefore be excluded at trial.
I
THE LAW’S NARROW UNDERSTANDING OF COERCION
Throughout history, police in the United States and En-
gland commonly used force to coerce suspects into confessing
(the “third degree”).11  The reliability of confessions was natu-
rally suspect, but the practice did not end in the United States
until the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in Brown v. Missis-
sippi.12  Many countries have banned the third degree as it
“brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner against society,
and lowers the esteem in which the administration of justice is
held by the public.”13  Without the availability of force, police
have turned to psychological methods such as trickery and lies
7 Dorothy Heyl, The Limits of Deception: An End to the Use of Lies and
Trickery in Custodial Interrogations to Elicit the “Truth”?, 77 ALB. L. REV. 931, 935
(2013).
8 People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308 (N.Y. 2014).
9 Id. at 314–15.
10 Id. at 316.
11 Examples of torture include waterboarding, putting lighted cigars on a
suspect’s body, and depriving the suspect of sleep, food, and other needs.  Saul M.
Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo &
Allison D. Redlich, Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommenda-
tions, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010).
12 297 U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation
Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1172–73 (2001).
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (quoting IV NAT’L COMM’N LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (1931)).
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to compel confessions.14  Recognizing the comparable harm
lies cause, Great Britain and most other European nations
have also banned police from lying in interrogations.15  In the
United States, the Supreme Court has not extended the ban to
lies.16
While police are able to lie and use trickery to obtain con-
fessions in the United States, they are not able to “coerce”
suspects to confess.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that
lies as well as force can be coercive in custodial interrogations,
but rather than ban all police lies, the Court required police to
give the Miranda warnings.17  Thus, two safeguards are cur-
rently in place to prevent police coercion.  First, when police
have suspects in custody, they must provide Miranda warnings
before they can interrogate.18  This is designed to ensure that
suspects are aware of their right to remain silent and their right
to an attorney.  Second, under the Due Process Clause, sus-
pects must confess voluntarily.19  The requirement that a con-
fession be voluntary is separate from the Miranda warnings.20
For confessions to be voluntary, the state must prove they were
not products of coercion, either physical or psychological,21
and were given as a result of “free and unconstrained choice by
[their] maker.”22
To determine whether the confession was the product of
the maker’s own choice, courts examine the totality of the cir-
cumstances.23  Under the totality of the circumstances test,
14 Id. (“[T]he modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented.”).
15 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 17. R
16 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
17 Id. at 448 (“[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical . . . [T]he blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.”) (quoting
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)); see also FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E.
REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
343 (5th ed. 2013) (“[N]o confession following interrogation is completely volun-
tary in the psychological sense of the word.”).
18 Daniel Harkins, Revisiting Colorado v. Connelly: The Problem of False Con-
fessions in the Twenty-First Century, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 319, 330 (2013).
19 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961).
20 Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 602–03 (2006).
21 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 503; see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 602 (1961) (“The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is
lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to
propel the confession.”).  For a review of the law of voluntariness of confessions,
see Marcus, supra note 20. R
22 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.
23 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
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courts consider the behavior of the police officers, the location
and length of the interrogation, and the characteristics of the
suspects.24  Relevant characteristics of suspects include age,
intellectual function, maturity, mental health, and physical
condition (including states like intoxication).25  The totality of
the circumstances also includes whether the suspects were
properly Mirandized and voluntarily waived their rights.26  The
reliability, or unreliability, of the confession is not itself a part
of the due process analysis.27
Even though the requirement that suspects confess volun-
tarily is separate from the requirement that they be Mirandized,
when courts assess voluntariness, they often place great
weight on the Miranda warnings.28  If suspects are properly
Mirandized, courts rarely deem their confessions involuntary.29
Relying on Miranda to ensure voluntariness is misguided.  As-
serting one’s Miranda rights connotes guilt: people only invoke
Miranda when they have something to hide, or so the thinking
goes.  Consequently, most suspects waive their Miranda rights,
leaving Miranda with little power to protect against police coer-
cion.30  Moreover, suspects’ decisions to waive Miranda can
then be used against them to establish the due process volun-
tariness of any resulting confessions.31
24 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164 (holding that a suspect’s mental illness is not
sufficient to render a confession involuntary; there must be state-imposed
coercion).
25 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693–94 (1993).
26 Id.
27 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167; Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 105, 106 (1997).
28 See Heyl, supra note 7, at 938 (“The overwhelmingly common approach is R
to evaluate the due process of a custodial interrogation only in terms of whether
proper Miranda warnings were provided, understood, and intelligently waived,
and not to evaluate the coercive effect of the psychological techniques.”); see also
Gerard E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233,
234 (2007) (“It is a firmly established aspect of the Miranda story that the decision
was the product, in part, of judicial frustration with the difficulty of applying a
‘totality of the circumstances’ test for determining the voluntariness of
confessions.”).
29 Magid, supra note 12, at 1175–76. (stating that, after Miranda, the Su- R
preme Court’s decisions have been more favorable toward police interrogations
and confessions).
30 See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 266, 286 (1996) (observing 182 police interrogations and finding that 78%
of suspects waived their Miranda rights); see also Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J.
Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of Innocence, 28 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 211, 215–17 (2004) (finding that 81% of innocent people waived their
Miranda rights compared to 36% of guilty people in an experimental study).
31 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051, 1093 (2010).
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Consistent with courts’ deference to the Miranda safe-
guard, once suspects have been Mirandized, courts have
deemed confessions to be voluntary despite police lies regard-
ing the seriousness of the charges, promises of leniency, and
the presence of physical evidence and accomplice state-
ments.32  Courts generally do not deem lies to be coercive so
long as they do not impact suspects’ decisions regarding waiv-
ers of Miranda rights.33  A few courts have noted that police lies
are improper, but they rarely hold that the lies caused suspects
to confess involuntarily.34  For example, the Supreme Court
held that a confession was voluntary in Frazier v. Cupp when
an adult suspect of average intelligence confessed in response
to a police officer’s lie about an accomplice confessing during a
brief interrogation.35  As this type of lie is very common in
police interrogations, Frazier established that police deception
is not enough to render a confession involuntary.36
The Supreme Court has declined to clearly define when
police deception can be overly coercive.37  The Court character-
ized most police deception as merely strategic and not “ris[ing]
to the level of . . . coercion to speak.”38  Some lower courts have
held that certain forms of deception may be so egregious that
they violate due process.39  For example, courts have held that
the fabrication of evidence (rather than merely falsely asserting
the presence of evidence) is impermissible.40  This is motivated
32 For a review of these cases, see Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation
Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 795–803 (2006).
33 Id. at 795; see also Marcus, supra note 20, at 612 (finding a “stunning” R
number of cases in which judges held confessions to be valid when government
officials lied to defendants about significant matters to induce the incriminating
statements).  In a thorough review, Marcus found only two courts that expressed
concern about police lying about evidence: United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030,
1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the lie to be “reprehensible,” and State v. Register,
476 S.E.2d 153, 158 (S.C. 1996) (finding the lie to be “deplorable”).  Despite their
critiques of the lies, in both cases the confessions were admitted into evidence.
Marcus, supra note 20, at 612. R
34 Marcus, supra note 20, at 638 (stating that the voluntariness determina- R
tion is very fact specific and difficult to predict).
35 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
36 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 13. R
37 Heyl, supra note 7, at 937 (noting that the Supreme Court did not specify R
means to identify or deter coercive interrogations, such as by requiring time limits
on interrogations).
38 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990).
39 State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1015 (Utah 1999) (finding that police
misrepresentations must be “sufficiently egregious to overcome a defendant’s will
so as to render a confession involuntary”).
40 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 13. R
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by a concern that the fabricated evidence could later be mis-
taken for real evidence by a court.41
In addition, courts have acknowledged that other forms of
deception may violate due process when the egregiousness of
the techniques combines with certain characteristics of the
suspect.42  For example, in People v. Thomas, the court held
that police lies were coercive when police told Thomas that if he
confessed he could save his son’s life, his wife would not be
picked up for questioning, and police would view what hap-
pened to his son as accidental.43  The court identified numer-
ous other lies that police told Thomas, but found that only
these three were improperly coercive.  The court reasoned that
because these lies threatened to deprive Thomas of vital inter-
ests (his wife and child), the combination of the lies were “suffi-
ciently potent to nullify individual judgment.”44  With respect to
the lie that a confession could save his son’s life, the court
noted that it would make the option of remaining silent “seem
valueless” to a parent.45  Moreover, the court considered that
Thomas was “unsophisticated” and had no experience with the
criminal justice system.46  The court relied on the totality of the
circumstances, finding that a lie on its own was not sufficiently
coercive to overcome Thomas’s judgment.47  The holding in
Thomas should be expanded to include all lies told by police
during custodial interrogations as coercive and in violation of
due process.48  In the next sections, I argue that all lies told by
police during interrogations are coercive and wrongful.  The
confessions that result from these lies should be held involun-
tary as a matter of law.
II
THE WRONGFULNESS OF DECEPTION
The Supreme Court’s narrow definition of coercion ignores
the wrongfulness and persuasiveness of police lies during in-
41 Id.
42 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (“[C]ertain interrogation tech-
niques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particu-
lar suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be
condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
43 8 N.E.3d 308, 311–16 (N.Y. 2014).
44 Id. at 314; Heyl, supra note 7, at 941, 947. R
45 Thomas, 8 N.E.3d at 315.
46 Id. at 314.
47 Heyl, supra note 7, at 949. R
48 The current lack of a bright-line rule has given police little guidance on the
limits on deceptive interrogation techniques. Id. at 939.
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terrogations.49  In determining whether lies by police during
interrogations are wrongful, I will first evaluate the extent to
which they are coercive.  Under the current legal framework,
confessions are not admissible at trial when they overcome the
suspect’s will.50  Apart from physical force, no other form of
police coercion is unmistakably banned.51  Nonetheless, force
and lies are both sufficiently coercive that they should be
banned from interrogations.
A. When State Action Is Coercive
Under a broad understanding of coercion, coercion is a
technique employed to induce a target to do or not do some-
thing.  In that way, coercion diminishes the target’s freedom
and responsibility.  On the other hand, coercion is also a useful
device in regulation.  In fact, coercion is a fundamental tool
that governments use to enforce laws.  Threats of punishment
induce the target to follow the law and limit the target’s free-
dom to acting in the manner the coercer wishes.52  Therefore,
threats of punishment are a form of coercion.  Threats of pun-
ishment are not wrongful because they are necessary to pre-
vent private acts that have a greater impact on freedom, such
as acts of violence and theft of property.53  To that end, the
state’s use of coercion facilitates private cooperation and
peaceful coexistence.  Furthermore, those who are governed
have consented to the state having this coercive power for the
stability it creates in society.54  Because coercion is a powerful
tool that the citizens have granted the government, it is also
important to have measures in place that guide and justify the
49 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 794 N.E.2d 1229, 1232–33
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (disapproving of the use of lies to make the suspect believe
there was video evidence against him, but finding the confession voluntary).
Before Miranda, courts were more likely to find that forms of police deception
could render coercions involuntary per se.  Gohara, supra note 32, at 801.
50 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
51 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 246 (1651),  http://www.gutenberg.org/
ebooks/3207?msg=welcome_stranger [https://perma.cc/FJ7C-3R3X] (stating
that in a civil state there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise
violate their faith).
53 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689), reprinted in THE WORKS
OF JOHN LOCKE 5, 106 (1823), http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/
3ll3/locke/government.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9NG-MLKU].
54 See id. at 155–56; see also Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. 1, 9 (2015) (discussing how the coerced party has consented to government
coercion in certain circumstances), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2015/entries/coercion/ [https://perma.cc/SX55-JULC].
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coercive actions.55  Otherwise, a tyrannical government could
arrest innocent people by deeming them criminals.56  In order
to determine where governmental coercion should be limited,
first I examine when coercion is wrongful.
Coercion typically takes the form of a conditional threat.
The coercer claims that he or she will bring about undesirable
consequences unless the target does a certain action.  This is
similar to the structure of an ordinary offer, which is not coer-
cive or wrongful.  An offer is not coercive because, unlike a
threat, the consequences of an offer are typically desirable to
the target.  Both coercion and offers are commonly accepted
parenting practices.  For example: “If you do not clean your
room, you cannot watch television,” or “If you eat your vegeta-
bles, you can have dessert.”
The difference between a threat and an offer also rests on
the relationship between the proposal and external factors.
Robert Nozick illustrates the distinction in his distressing slave
owner hypothetical.57  In this example, the slave owner regu-
larly beats his slave, and one day he tells his slave that he will
spare him a beating if the slave does a specified action.  Al-
though the offer of sparing the slave a beating will make the
slave better off, we typically see this as coercive, and so it is a
threat instead of an offer.  In this example, the slave would be
coerced to do the action in light of the slave owner’s regular
threat of beatings.  Thus, context is also an important factor in
determining whether a proposal is coercive.
In addition to the threat and offer distinction, another way
to determine whether a proposal is coercive is to examine the
relative bargaining power of the parties.  We can classify the
slave owner’s proposal as coercive because the slave owner has
superior bargaining power over the slave.58  Under this analy-
sis, proposals are coercive when two factors are present: (1) the
weaker party is dependent on the stronger party (the weaker
party has no other options and cannot exchange bargaining
partners) and (2) the stronger party has influence over whether
some evil will occur to the weaker party (loss of life, health,
security).59  When both of these conditions are present, the
stronger party’s advantage in bargaining is so strong that the
55 See LOCKE, supra note 53, at 165. R
56 See id. at 165.
57 See Anderson, supra note 54, at 23 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, Coercion, in R
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (1969)).
58 See id. at 14 (citing Joan McGregor, Bargaining Advantages and Coercion
in the Market, 14 PHIL. RES. ARCHIVES 23, 25 (1989)).
59 Id.
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target’s choice will be non-free.  If stronger parties take advan-
tage of this by doing something seen as harmful or distasteful,
the coercion is wrongful.  The next section will apply this
framework to evaluate when police actions are coercive and
wrongful.60
Force can also be a means of coercion when it is used to
alter or constrain the target’s actions.  Unlike conditional
threats, force employs domination that is physical rather than
mental.61  While threats influence the targets by limiting their
choices, force removes choice altogether.  The United States
now prohibits the use of force to induce suspects to confess.  I
will compare force and deception in the evaluation of the
wrongfulness of police lies.62
B. When State Coercion Is Wrongful
Coercion by the state is not per se wrongful as it is deemed
necessary to enforce laws, which protect freedom and promote
stability.63  Moreover, not all coercion impedes the target’s free
will.  For example, threats of punishment are justified to coerce
individuals to act in manners consistent with the law.  On the
other hand, coercion is very potent and prone to abuse.  State
coercion is wrongful when it goes beyond the enforcement of
laws and enhances the already superior bargaining power of
the state to the detriment of the individuals.
Using the framework for evaluating whether statements
are coercive based on the relative bargaining power of the par-
ties,64 police statements in interrogations can be coercive.  The
police officer is in a superior bargaining position based on both
factors.  First, during interrogations the police are in complete
control of the environment.  When suspects are in custody, the
police restrict their ability to freely leave.  In addition, the envi-
ronment of the interrogation is unpleasant.65  Police can ques-
tion suspects menacingly for hours in an unfamiliar
atmosphere.  Furthermore, the suspects are not generally in a
position to choose the police officer with whom they speak.
Thus, while they are in custody, the suspects are dependent on
the police officers.  Second, the officer is in control of whether
60 See infra subparts II.B and D.
61 Klockars, supra note 2, at 532. R
62 See infra subpart II.D.
63 See supra subpart II.A.
64 See supra subpart II.A.
65 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) (“[T]he very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness
of individuals.”).
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the suspect goes to prison, and therefore they have power over
an evil that may occur to the suspect.  Under the bargaining
power framework, because (1) suspects are dependent on po-
lice officers and (2) police officers have power over whether the
suspect goes to prison, all offers that police make during inter-
rogations are coercive.
In light of the power imbalance between the police officer
and the suspect, the police officer must not take advantage of
that imbalance; otherwise, the coercive offers made by police
are wrongful.  Police officers do not take advantage of their
power when they only seek to punish crimes to the extent that
they are allowed under the law.  It is not wrongful for police to
offer legal incentives to suspects to confess, which may cause a
confession to be in the best interests of the suspect and the
police officer.  In addition, police may say that they will charge
the suspect with a more serious crime if the suspect does not
confess.  When the more serious punishment is legally accept-
able in light of the crime, this is not a wrongful proposal be-
cause the police have the authority to impose heightened
punishment.  Furthermore, the target can make an informed
decision about which option to take.  In this way, truthful po-
lice incentives in interrogations are coercive, but they are not
wrongful when they do not go beyond the power of police to
enforce the law.
Furthermore, threatening the suspect with undesirable
consequences (sanctioned by law) is not wrongful.  We have
authorized police to make certain choices less appealing than
they would be otherwise (like the choice to engage in criminal
activity).  As a society, we do not feel that we are less free just
because our choices to do certain types of behavior have unde-
sirable consequences (particularly behaviors that impinge on
the freedom of others).
C. When Lies Are Wrongful
Like conditional threats, lies can limit targets’ freedom
when agents use lies to induce targets to do or not do some-
thing.66  Individuals make choices based upon estimates of
their current situation, and these estimates often rely on infor-
mation from others.67  Lies can distort this information and
66 One definition of a lie is an intentionally deceptive message which is stated.
See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13 (1978); see also
Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police,
76 OR. L. REV. 775, 789–801 (1997) (applying Bok’s framework to police lies).
67 BOK, supra note 66, at 19–20. R
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therefore distort the situations as the targets of the lies per-
ceive them.68  Thus, lies can vary targets’ estimates of the costs
and benefits of a course of action.  For example, lies may foster
an unnecessary loss of confidence in the targets’ best option.
In addition, lies may eliminate or obscure the targets’ percep-
tion of relevant alternatives.69  This invades the targets’ auton-
omy and ability to make decisions and gives the liar power over
the targets’ choices.  Thus, lies can also be a form of coercion.
The coercive quality of lies and our vulnerability to it underlie
the importance of truthfulness in our society.
As with all forms of coercion, lies are powerful tools ripe for
abuse.  Lies are similar to force in that both can influence the
way the target behaves and therefore disrespect the target’s
autonomy.70  While lies influence the targets’ perceptions of
their choices, force removes all choice.  In addition, both meth-
ods can be unreliable and are subject to resistance from the
target, either through disbelief in the context of lies or through
defiance in the context of force.71
Unlike threatening punishment, police do not need to lie to
enforce laws.  Instead, police can only justify lies based on the
possibility that they may achieve a greater good.  In light of the
harms to society, I first presume lies are wrongful.  One need
not rule out all lies due to the initial negative weight given to
them, however.  To that end, one may justifiably lie when there
is no other good and truthful alternative, and the harms
caused by the lie are outweighed by its benefits.72  Lying is
harmful because it can denigrate the target, coarsen the liar,
and diminish the level of trust in society as a whole.73  Justifi-
cations for lying include preventing harm, producing a benefit,
contributing to fairness, and correcting injustice.74  For exam-
ple, one can justify a lie when it is the only way to save an
innocent life.  In this situation, one could also justify the use of
force.  In fact, when force is justifiable, one would always prefer
lies if they are a viable alternative.75
68 Id.
69 Id. at 19–20.
70 Klockars, supra note 2, at 532; see also BOK, supra note 66, at 18 (“Deceit R
and violence—these are the two forms of deliberate assault on human beings.”).
71 Klockars, supra note 2, at 532. R
72 BOK, supra note 66, at 78–86. R
73 Id. at 21.
74 Id. at 78–86.
75 Id. at 41 (“Surely if force is allowed, a lie should be equally, perhaps at
times more, permissible.”).
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Even in these limited situations, society must be wary of
sanctioning lying because a liar can easily manipulate these
concepts to justify any lie.  In order to safeguard against the
potential for the spread and abuse of lies, moral philosopher
Sissela Bok emphasized that lies must be public so that rea-
sonable people who share the perspective of the deceived and
those affected by the lies can evaluate the lie.76  When people in
power tell lies, the potential for spread and abuse is magnified,
thus giving rise to the need for clear standards and safeguards.
D. When Police Lies Are Wrongful
The goal of modern American police interrogations is to
communicate that a suspect’s resistance is futile because the
outcome is inevitable, and therefore it is in the suspect’s inter-
ests to confess.77  Police will lie to further these goals by mini-
mizing the seriousness of the offense and misrepresenting the
strength of the evidence.78  Lies about the strength of the evi-
dence include presenting supposedly incontrovertible evidence
of the suspect’s guilt and stating that a codefendant has al-
ready confessed.79  The leading police interrogation manual
recommends these practices, which are also known as the
“Reid Technique.”80
In evaluating the wrongfulness of police deception in inter-
rogations, I will examine the extent to which certain forms of
coercion improperly constrain the freedom of the suspect.
Before examining police lies, I will use these factors to examine
police force, which has been banned in interrogations in the
United States.
1. Why Police Force Is Wrongful
Police force is both coercive and wrongful when used dur-
ing interrogations.  As discussed previously, police are in a
superior bargaining position when suspects are in custody.81
When police have a suspect in custody, the police are in com-
plete control over the suspect’s environment and have power
over whether the suspect will go to jail.  Because of the power
imbalance in interrogations, offers that police make to suspects
during interrogations are coercive.  Coercive offers are only
76 Id. at 91.
77 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 16–17.
78 Slobogin, supra note 66, at 785–86. R
79 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 17.
80 INBAU ET AL., supra note 17, at 351–52.
81 See supra subpart II.B.
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wrongful when police take advantage of their superior bargain-
ing power.  For example, police do not take advantage of their
superior bargaining power when they make truthful offers to
suspects that are consistent with enforcing the law.82  While
truthful offers may limit a suspect’s options, the use of force
takes away those options altogether.  The use of force in inter-
rogations involves inflicting physical or mental pain to extract
confessions, such as physical violence and torture.83  Thus, the
police are using their already superior power to gain an even
greater advantage over the suspect at the expense of the dignity
of the suspect.  In addition, police use of force damages our
trust in the government.  As state actors charged with enforc-
ing the law, police are held to a higher moral standard than
average citizens.84  The use of force conflicts with this high
standard.
Furthermore, the use of force conflicts with the intent of
the privilege against self-incrimination.  The privilege devel-
oped in response to the use of violence in interrogations
throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries.85  Seventeenth-century interrogations were often a fishing
expedition to elicit incriminating statements from suspects
confronted with charges on little evidence.  In addition, interro-
gators employed methods such as torture, detention for long
periods, imprisonment in a pillory, and mutilation.  The privi-
lege was a major constitutional landmark in the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in contrast to England,
where it “slowly ‘crept’” into the system.86  In the United States,
the privilege was deemed essential to political freedom in the
McCarthy hearings of the 1950s and was reaffirmed in Miranda
v. Arizona in 1966.87  This reflects “our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes ‘a shelter to the guilty,’ is often ‘a
protection to the innocent.’”88  Because of the violation of the
82 See supra subpart II.B.
83 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448–49 (1966).
84 Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959) (“The abhorrence of
society to the use of involuntary confessions . . . turns on the deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves”).
85 SUSAN EASTON, SILENCE AND CONFESSIONS: THE SUSPECT AS THE SOURCE OF
EVIDENCE 5 (2014).
86 Id. at 6.
87 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; see also EASTON, supra note 85, at 6 (summarizing R
the development of the privilege against self-incrimination in the United States).
88 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)
(quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)).
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suspect’s dignity, the diminished trust in government, and the
conflict with the presumption of innocence, the use of force is
wrongful in interrogations.
Like the use of force, forms of police lies in interrogations
are also wrongful for the same reasons.  As I have already es-
tablished that police are in a superior bargaining position dur-
ing interrogations, the remainder of this Part will examine
when police lies are an abuse of their power.  At the outset, lies
should be presumed to be an abuse of police power.  Both lies
and force are rarely legitimate in societies that respect the au-
tonomy of individuals.  In fact, police maintain the only occu-
pation that has the power to use both lies and force.89
2. Why Police Lies Are Wrongful
Under Bok’s framework for evaluating the justifications of
lying, I consider the harms of police lies during interrogations.
As with force, the harms of police lies include diminished dig-
nity and autonomy of the suspect, damage to our trust in gov-
ernment, and the violation of the presumption of innocence.90
The action of deceiving suspects in order to obtain confes-
sions diminishes the dignity of the suspect.91  When suspects
confess in response to police lies, they are not accurately in-
formed of their situations and therefore cannot make intelli-
gent legal decisions.  This is in sharp contrast to a defendant’s
decision to testify at trial.  In this situation, the defendant is
likely to consider advice from an attorney; and a prosecutor,
who is not allowed to lie, will question the defendant.92
Preventing police from lying will preserve suspects’ abilities to
make knowing decisions to confess based on circumstances as
they correctly believe them to be.
In addition, because police are held to a higher moral stan-
dard, the notion that a police officer would lie should cause
concern.93  The assumption that police follow a higher stan-
dard makes police lies particularly persuasive.  In addition,
because suspects are in a state of heightened vulnerability in
89 Id.
90 See Slobogin, supra note 66, at 796–800. R
91 See id. at 796.
92 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014), http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_
rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_4_fairness_to_opposing_party_counsel.
html [https://perma.cc/98LA-5EPJ].
93 After reading thousands of opinions on confessions, Marcus described feel-
ing “unclean and tainted by government activities that are not honorable even
given the environment needed for interrogations.”  Marcus, supra note 20, at 643.
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an interrogation setting, they are more likely to accept police
statements on their face.94
Finally, as with the use of force, police lies conflict with the
intent of the privilege against self-incrimination.  Current inter-
rogation techniques are often premised on obtaining a confes-
sion rather than simply gathering evidence.  The creators of the
“Reid Technique” advise interrogators that they must possess
“a great deal of inner confidence in [their] ability to detect truth
or deception, elicit confessions from the guilty, and stand be-
hind decisions of truthfulness.”95  Thus, by definition, interro-
gation is a process in which the interrogators presume the guilt
of the interrogated, direct the interaction based on their own
theory, and measure success by the extraction of an admission
from that suspect.96  This is evident in the interrogation of
Thomas when police admittedly did everything they could to get
him to tell “the truth.”97  Police may mistakenly assume that
lies, like false evidence ploys, will only deceive guilty suspects
because innocent suspects will realize that the police are lying.
Thus, when police lie to suspects, they often have presumed
that the suspect is guilty and are searching only for evidence
that confirms their beliefs.
In reality, lies distort the suspect’s estimates of the costs
and benefits of confessing.98  For example, when a police officer
lies about the presence of evidence, an innocent person may
feel that it is necessary to confess to avoid conviction of a more
serious offense.  Therefore, lies allow police to make conditional
offers that attempt to induce the suspect to confess based on
false information about the suspect’s legal situation.  Like
force, police lies are an abuse of power because they give police
an even greater advantage over the suspect.  In light of the
harms of police lies, police must never lie unless no truthful,
non-coercive alternatives are available.99
94 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (recognizing the height-
ened vulnerability that suspects’ experience when they are in custody); see also
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 556 (1897) (describing the inherently coer-
cive atmosphere of interrogations).
95 Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING 214 (Tom Williamson ed., 2006); see also INBAU ET AL.,
supra note 17 (instructing investigators on the Reid Technique). R
96 See Slobogin, supra note 66, at 796–800. R
97 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
98 See, e.g., Magid, supra note 12, at 1175 (stating that in Miranda, the Court R
“observed that [deceptive interrogation] techniques created or increased the dis-
advantage most suspects had in matching wits with their interrogators”).
99 Slobogin also noted that lies may encourage police to lie more often in other
situations, which could foster corruption.  Slobogin, supra note 66, at 800. R
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When a suspect attempts to use knowledge of his or her
criminal activity to gain an advantage over the police in the
interrogation, police lies do not rise to the same level of coer-
cion.  This may occur when suspects have knowledge of the
location of a victim and use this to obtain bargaining power in
the interrogation.  Here, the suspect may be able to coerce the
police and exert power over police decision-making.  In this
situation, police lies are no longer an abuse of power because
the police are not in a superior bargaining position.
III
WEIGHING THE BENEFITS OF DECEPTION
Despite the wrongfulness of lying, one might nonetheless
believe deception is justified if it comes with some overriding
benefit.  For example, police lies in interrogations may be justi-
fied when lies are necessary to avoid a serious crisis.100  In a
crisis context, it is important to keep in mind that liars can be
“counted upon to exaggerate the threat, its immediacy, or its
need.”101  Therefore, there must be some showing of imminent
danger to another person’s interests before recognizing a crisis.
These situations should be rare because in most investiga-
tions, police are not even sure the suspect is a criminal, much
less that harm is imminent.102
Police lying may also be justified when it is necessary to
protect society from an “enemy.”103  In order to determine that
a suspect (who has not been convicted of the crime) is truly an
enemy, there must be a public expression of the suspect as the
enemy.  In order to comply with this requirement, Christopher
Slobogin suggested a requirement of ex ante review by a judge,
similar to the warrant process, before a police officer may en-
gage in deception.  This recognizes the difficultly of having a
public debate about whether a suspect who has not been con-
victed of the crime is a criminal.  This suggestion weakens the
requirement of the presumption of innocence.104  In addition,
the extent to which lies are necessary to protect society from
criminals is hotly debated.
100 See id. at 792–93.
101 Id. (citing BOK, supra note 66, at 119–22). R
102 Id. at 801.
103 Id. at 794–95.
104 See supra section II.D.2.
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A. Empirical Evidence Examining the Benefits of Police
Lies
Proponents of police deception argue that even though ly-
ing is wrongful, in interrogations it is a necessary evil because
of the importance of lies in eliciting confessions,105 which play
an important role in solving crimes.106  Indeed, confessions are
often referred to as the “gold standard” in evidence.107  Lies are
fundamental to modern American interrogation techniques,
which are designed to persuade a rational person to confess
instead of denying culpability, even when confessing is not in
the person’s best interests.  To that end, police must manipu-
late suspects’ perceptions of their best interests and their via-
ble alternatives.108  Police may do this by leading suspects to
believe that the evidence against them is overwhelming, that
they will be convicted regardless of their confession, and that
they will receive advantages from confessing.109  For example,
suspects often report that they confessed because they per-
ceived the evidence against them to be overwhelming.110
In observations of 182 police interrogations, Richard Leo
noted that police officers began interrogations by confronting
the suspects with true evidence in 85% of cases but lied about
the presence of evidence in 30% of cases.111  In addition, police
offered suspects incentives to confess in 88% of the observed
105 See Gohara, supra note 32, at 809 (“[T]he Inbau Manual makes it clear that R
employing trickery and deceit is essential to an interrogator’s strategy for eliciting
a confession.”); see also Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to
Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979,
985 (1997) (describing contemporary American methods of interrogation that seek
to “manipulate the individual’s analysis of his immediate situation and his per-
ceptions of both the choices available to him, and of the consequences of each
possible course of action”); Miller W. Shealy, Jr., The Hunting of Man: Lies, Damn
Lies, and Police Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 21, 38–43
(2014).
106 See Marcus, supra note 20, at 607 (“[C]onfessions are ‘essential to society’s R
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law.’”) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)); Shealy, supra note
105, at 39 (highlighting that forensic evidence is not always present); see also R
Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 983–84 (“A confession—whether true or false—is R
arguably the most damaging evidence the government can present in a trial.”).
107 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 4. R
108 See, e.g., Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 985 (observing that interrogators R
must make a suspect believe that confessing to a crime is “rational and
appropriate”).
109 See id. at 985–86.
110 Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, The Gudjonsson Confession
Questionnaire-Revised (GCQ-R): Factor Structure and Its Relationship with Person-
ality, 27 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 953, 954 (1999).
111 Leo, supra note 30, at 279 (describing what Leo found after observing 122 R
interrogations in person and sixty by videotape).
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interrogations.  In the end, suspects confessed in 64% of the
interrogations.  This rate increased to 76% when Leo excluded
cases in which suspects invoked their Miranda rights (leading
police to terminate the interrogation).  The most successful in-
terrogation techniques included appealing to the suspect’s con-
science, identifying contradictions in the suspect’s story, using
praise or flattery, and offering moral justifications for the
crime.112  Lying about the presence of evidence did not signifi-
cantly increase the probability of soliciting a confession.113
These results suggest that lies are not necessary for successful
police interrogations.
Lies are not only unbeneficial to interrogations; they can
actually be harmful, as police lies are likely to encourage an
innocent person to confess.  Suspects respond to police lies by
falsely confessing for two main reasons: social compliance114
and memory failure.115  In the case of social compliance, police
lies may make it clear to suspects that the police want a confes-
sion, which may cause the suspects to tell the police what they
want to hear, if only to put an end to the interrogation.116
Alternatively, the false evidence may persuade a suspect that
their chances of exoneration are hopeless and thus confessing
is in their best interest if it would lead to a lighter sentence.117
Police lies about evidence and the strength of their case may
also affect cognition by convincing vulnerable suspects that
they are guilty even though they have no memory of committing
112 Id. at 293–94 (finding that these tactics elicited a confession in 90–97% of
cases and were the only tactics that made confessions significantly more likely).
113 Id. at 294 (finding that false evidence elicited a confession in 83% of cases,
which was not significantly higher than the baseline of 76%, which reflects the
sample of interrogations after a Miranda waiver).
114 This is labeled a “coerced-compliant” false confession. See Saul M. Kassin
& Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance,
Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 125 (1996).
115 This is labeled a “coerced-internalized” false confession. Id.
116 For example, Kharey Wise, a member of the exonerated “Central Park Five,”
said that after police falsely told him that his friends said he was present at a
crime scene, he made up facts “just to give them what they wanted to hear.”
Gohara, supra note 32, at 792 (quoting House of Cards: Experts Say Interrogation R
Techniques Can Encourage False Confessions (ABC News television broadcast
Sept. 26, 2002)).
117 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 1045–50. R
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the crime.118  Police often encourage this belief by telling sus-
pects they may have repressed their memories of the crime.119
For example, police repeatedly told Adrian Thomas various
lies during the interrogation, including that information he
provided about how his son was injured could help save his
son’s life, even though his son was already brain-dead.120  This
type of police deception left Thomas with little room for dispute
since the police said their beliefs were supported by medical
evidence.121  Thomas did not have a background in medicine
and likely felt that the medical evidence could not be wrong.
When Thomas said he had no memory of injuring his son,
the police officer suggested that Thomas may have repressed
his memory.122  In addition, the officer said: “You better find
that memory right now, Adrian, you’ve got to find that memory.
This is important for your son’s life man.”123  In this way, the
police tried to convince Thomas that he was guilty even though
he had no memory of committing the crime.124  For suspects
who are less trusting of their memory due to young age, mental
illness, intellectual disability, or a history of drug and alcohol
abuse, this type of lie can be highly persuasive.125  Even if this
was not persuasive to Thomas, it was impossible for him to
prove he was not repressing his memory.
Throughout the interrogation, the police gave Thomas de-
tails suggesting what they believed happened to his son.126  In
fact, every incriminating statement that Thomas made was pre-
viously stated by police.127  The police asked Thomas to reenact
what had happened and gave Thomas a binder to represent his
son.  The police asked Thomas to throw the binder on the
ground in the same way he threw his son.  By this point, how-
ever, police had already told Thomas how they thought
118 See, e.g., Amelia Courtney Hritz, JoAnn, Video Presentation at the Con-
victed by Law, Acquitted by Social Science Panel during Cornell University’s Char-
ter Day Weekend (Apr. 25, 2015), https://youtu.be/WkghguFOl9Y [https://
perma.cc/6HUY-R5CS] (describing how JoAnn Taylor developed false memories of
committing a crime after repeated interrogations by police in which they
presented her with false evidence).
119 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 1000. R
120 SCENES OF A CRIME, supra note 6. R
121 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 1031. R
122 SCENES OF A CRIME, supra note 6.
123 People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 311 (N.Y. 2014).
124 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 1044. R
125 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 30.
126 Heyl, supra note 7, at 951. R
127 Id.
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Thomas’s son sustained his injuries.128  In addition, this made
it clear to Thomas that when the police told him that they
wanted the “truth,” in reality they wanted him to confess,
whether he was guilty or not.  As a result, Thomas’s confession
could not be corroborated with other evidence gathered in the
case.
In addition, police repeatedly told Thomas that if he con-
fessed, he would not be arrested and could go home.129  The
police sensed that Thomas did not believe this, so they told him
they would solemnly swear that they were not lying.  At the
beginning of the interview, Thomas may have thought that the
cost of confessing was high, but after these lies, he likely saw
little harm in it and thought he could gain the immediate ad-
vantage of being able to leave the long interrogation.130
In critiquing the reliability of Thomas’s confession, the
court benefitted from a videotape of the entire interrogation.131
In general, proving that police lies are a contributing factor in
eliciting a wrongful confession is very difficult because of the
characteristics of false confessions.  If police correctly identify
the confession as false, they often do not keep a record of it.132
If police incorrectly identify the confession as true, the case will
continue, and the confessor will often plead guilty or be con-
victed at trial.133
Once confessors are convicted, indisputably proving their
innocence is difficult.134  In fact, confessions can only be
proven false in rare situations.135  First, it may be objectively
established that the crime did not happen.  An example would
be if a person who was thought dead turns up alive.  Second, it
may be objectively established that the defendant could not
have committed the crime.  For example, direct evidence may
suggest that the defendant was in a different location at the
time of the crime.  Third, authorities may objectively prove the
128 The court noted that due to all of the details that the police fed Thomas, the
“confession provided no independent confirmation that he had in fact caused the
child’s fatal injuries.” Thomas, 8 N.E.3d at 316.
129 Id. at 311–12.
130 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 1053. R
131 Heyl, supra note 7, at 951.
132 See Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 5 (stating that no governmental or
private organizations keep records of false confessions).
133 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 105, at 984. R
134 Id.
135 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 925–27 (2004) (describing the four rare
situations in which a disputed confession can be classified as proven to be false
beyond any doubt).
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guilt of the true perpetrator.  Finally, scientific evidence, such
as DNA, may conclusively establish the defendant’s innocence.
Factually innocent defendants have no control over whether
these circumstances are present in their case.136  In the major-
ity of cases, completely removing doubt of a defendant’s inno-
cence is impossible.  Just as investigators struggle to find
objective evidence to convict a defendant (hence the need for
confessions), innocent defendants also struggle to find objec-
tive evidence to prove their innocence.  For example, despite its
prevalence on television, it is rare to find scientific evidence like
DNA.137  It is even more difficult to review cases involving minor
crimes when there is no post-conviction scrutiny and juvenile
cases where files are closely guarded for confidentiality.
DNA exonerations have revealed that police-induced false
confessions are one of the leading causes of wrongful convic-
tions.  Of the first 325 convictions to be overturned by DNA
evidence, 88 (27%) were based on false confessions or admis-
sions.138  DNA exonerations only include a small subset of
cases involving police interrogations, and therefore there is no
generally accepted estimate of the prevalence of false confes-
sions.139  Even with DNA exonerations, confessions are difficult
to study because in many cases police record only confessions
and not the prior questioning, if they record at all.  Other
records that could illuminate characteristics of the circum-
stances leading to the confession are often lacking.  This also
makes it difficult for researchers to compare true and false
confessions.
Researchers have designed experimental studies to ex-
amine the relationship between police lies and false confes-
sions.  Due to ethical considerations, researchers cannot go to
the same lengths that police may go to in pursuit of a confes-
sion.  On the other hand, they also do not raise the stakes of
confessing to the same level that suspects face in criminal
cases.140  A laboratory experiment performed by Kassin and
Kiechel demonstrated that misrepresentations about evidence
can cause significantly more suspects to confess to an act they
136 Id. at 927.
137 Id. at 925–27.
138 THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction [https://perma.cc/
V4JSA8TC].
139 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 5. R
140 See, e.g., Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 114, at 127 (differentiating between R
experiment subjects being accused of mere unconscious acts of negligence and
crime suspects being accused of explicit criminal acts).
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did not commit.141  Overall, 69% of the participants signed a
confession admitting to hitting a computer key despite warn-
ings that it would cause an error in the computer system, 28%
of the participants displayed an internalization of guilt by tell-
ing a stranger that they were responsible, and 9% confabulated
details when recreating the event with the experimenter.  When
a witness falsely confirmed that the participants had hit the
computer key, the rates of signing a confession and internal-
izing guilt increased significantly.142  When the false evidence
was combined with increased typing pace (causing the partici-
pants to be more vulnerable because they were in a heightened
state of uncertainty about their guilt), 100% signed a confes-
sion, 65% internalized, and 35% confabulated details.  These
results support both the social and cognitive factors involved in
false confessions, as suspects signed confessions in response
to social pressure but also maintained a belief in their guilt
when speaking with a stranger in the absence of the social
pressure.143  The measure of confabulation also displays how
false confessions can contain details of the crime, which may
make them difficult to differentiate from true confessions.
The Kassin and Kiechel study is limited in that it is highly
plausible that the participants accidently hit the computer key
and thus may have been uncertain of their innocence.144  This
limitation is minimized in another experimental paradigm in
which participants are induced to cheat on a problem-solving
task by a confederate.145  Using this paradigm, Russano and
colleagues found that 72% of people who were guilty of cheat-
ing confessed and 20% of people who were innocent con-
fessed.146  Interrogation techniques such as minimization and
offering deals increased rates of confession among both inno-
141 Id.
142 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 17 (describing how the Kassin & Kiechel
findings showed that “false evidence nearly doubled the number of students who
signed a written confession, from 48 to 94%”).
143 Multiple studies have used this paradigm to examine false confessions.
For a review, see Christian A. Meissner, Allison D. Redlich, Stephen W. Michael,
Jacqueline R. Evans, Catherine R. Camilletti, Sujeeta Bhatt & Susan Brandon,
Accusatorial and Information-Gathering Interrogation Methods and Their Effects on
True and False Confessions: A Meta-Analytic Review, 10 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 459
(2014).
144 Melissa B. Russano, Christian A. Meissner, Fadia M. Narchet & Saul M.
Kassin, Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental
Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481, 482 (2005).
145 See id. at 483.
146 Id. at 484.
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cent and guilty people.147  While this experiment did not mea-
sure police lies explicitly, police often lie when using
minimization techniques; for example, they may misrepresent
the seriousness or nature of the offense.148  Multiple studies
have replicated both the Kassin and Kiechel typing paradigm
and the Russano et al. cheating paradigm with various manip-
ulations and have also found that participants are more likely
to falsely confess when presented with false evidence.149
Despite the difficulty in studying confessions and the vari-
ous limitations that exist within each method, research has
consistently demonstrated that innocent people confess.150
Furthermore, because false confessions have been demon-
strated across a wide array of research methods, the magni-
tude of various limitations is decreased.151  There is enough
evidence to raise concern about the legitimacy of the Inbau
Manual’s claim that self-preservation will cause innocent sus-
pects to stand up to interrogation techniques such as decep-
tion.152  In addition, the use of false evidence has been
implicated in the vast majority of documented false confes-
sions.153  At the very least, we do not know the full effects of
police deception.154  As I have shown, deception is prima facie
wrongful, so the burden is on the people promoting deception
to prove that the benefits of lies outweigh the many harms.
CONCLUSION
In order to preserve individual liberty in the interrogation
room, police lies should be banned unless warranted by immi-
nent necessity.  Like the use of force, evidence of police lies
should be sufficient to determine that a confession is not vol-
147 Minimization involves offering sympathy or concern, offering justifications
for the transgression, and suggesting it was in their interest to cooperate. Id. at
482–83.
148 Skolnick & Leo, supra note 3, at 6. R
149 See Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 17 (describing follow-up studies that R
manipulated the plausibility of the typing error by suggesting that the participant
hit a more distant key, increased the harms of confessing by introducing financial
consequences, and increased the credibility of the false evidence by introducing
fabricated video evidence).
150 For a review, see id. at 5.
151 Id.
152 INBAU ET AL., supra note 17, at 351 (“The ordinary citizen is outraged and R
indignant when presented with supposed ‘evidence’ of an act he knows he did not
commit.”); see also Gohara, supra note 32, at 825 (noting that the Inbau Manual R
does not back up their claims with empirical evidence).
153 Kassin et al., supra note 11, at 12.
154 See, e.g., Shealy, supra note 105, at 64–65 (arguing that DNA exonerations R
are the only conclusive proof of false confessions).
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untary.  This rule recognizes the fact that a power imbalance
exists in the interrogation room, with suspects being more vul-
nerable and dependent on the police.  Police lies are an abuse
of this superior power, as they disregard the autonomy of the
suspect, enhance distrust in government, and violate the pre-
sumption of innocence.
Exceptions to the ban on lying are warranted in the rare
situations where there is a crisis and/or a suspect is attempt-
ing to exert an improper influence over the police through
knowledge of criminal activity.  This narrow carve-out of the
ban on police deception allows police to lie when suspects are
using criminal activity to gain an advantage over police.
The current voluntariness standard almost always allows
police to lie in interrogations.  This impermissibly places the
power to determine when to lie with the police, even though
liars can be counted upon to justify lying by exaggerating “the
threat, its immediacy, or its need.”155  Furthermore, the cur-
rent standard relies primarily on the Miranda rights to protect
suspects, even though most suspects waive these rights. Peo-
ple v. Thomas recognized that certain forms of deceptive police
tactics can be coercive.  Now it is time to take the next step.  As
with the ban on the use of force in interrogations, it is time to
reconsider a ban on police deception because “[i]t is not suffi-
cient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by irregular or
improper means.”156
155 BOK, supra note 66, at 119–22. R
156 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966) (quoting the IV NAT’L COMM’N
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5
(1931)).
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